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Corporations—Stockholders' Vote Not to Institute Suit as a Bar to a
Derivative Action Based on Alleged Violations of Antitrust Legislation.
—Rogers v. American Can Co. 1—Rogers brings derivative suit on behalf
of Metal and Thermit Corp. (hereinafter called M. and T.) against American
Can Co. (holding a substantial minority stock interest in M. and T.), eight
of twelve directors of M. and T., and M. and T. (named as nominal defend-
ant) for treble damages and injunctive relief under the antitrust laws. 2
M. and T. is engaged in the detinning of tin plate scrap, the sale of such
detinned steel scrap to steel manufacturers and the sale or use of the tin
recovered in the detinning process. American Can Co. is the principal supplier
of tin plate scrap to M. and T. To order to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b), 5
plaintiff engaged in a proxy battle in which the facts upon which this suit
is based were submitted to the shareholders. A majority of the shareholders,
exclusive of the shares owned by American Can Co. and the directors named
as parties defendant, re-elected the same directors and voted not to institute
the suit. Defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint and for summary
judgment. HELD: The shareholders' vote will not bar the derivative suit, as
it was an attempted ratification of past violations of the antitrust laws and an
implied authorization of future violations.
The shareholders' power to determine whether or not to sue has long
been recognized. 4 This power is in conformity with the generally accepted
view that a corporation is designed to function under "majority rule."6
"To permit a minority shareholder to interfere with the corporation's choice
of a course of action, in the exercise of its sound discretion in view of all
the peculiar circumstances, is a serious invasion of the right of majority
control." 6 The derivative action is an extraordinary remedy conceived to
protect the corporation and its shareholders by permitting a shareholder to
enforce a corporate cause of action on behalf of the corporation. The right
to maintain a derivative suit, consequently, meets head on with the concept
of "majority rule."
In determining whether the stockholders' vote would bar the derivative
suit, the court distinguished past cases on the basis of whether the vote
represented a "business judgment" of a majority of well informed and
disinterested shareholders not to sue, or was an attempted "ratification"
of an illegal act. If the vote represented a "business judgment," there would
be circumstances under which the vote would bar a derivative suit, but if
I Rogers v. American Can Co., 187 F. Supp. 532 ( D.N.J. 1960).
2 Clayton Act § 4, 7, 8, 16, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §1 15, 18, 19, 26 (1958);
Sherman Act II 1, 2, as amended, 69 Stat, 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §1 1, 2 (1958).
3 Requiring exhaustion of intra-corporate remedies.
4 United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 344 U.S. 261 (1950) ;
Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882).
Lattin, Corporations 355 (1959): "Furthermore, where the question of whether
suit should or should not be brought is submitted to the shareholders for affirmation
by an inquiring board and the majority shareholders decide, in good faith, that suit
ought not be brought, that should end the matter."
8 Notes and Legislation, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1368, 1374 (1940).
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found to be an attempted "ratification," the vote would be considered a
nullity, not effecting a bar to the action. 7
This test is a concise and convenient method for obtaining a desired
result. But its application brings into focus difficulties stemming from the
necessary inquiry into the elusive nature of the shareholders' intent. Though
the test admits of precise definition, the criteria for its application are not
set forth. The difficulties arise from the failure of the negative vote to reflect
whether the shareholders were motivated by an intent to "ratify" or impliedly
authorize an illegal act, or to exercise "business judgment." The opinion states
that ". . . if the vote stated specifically that the stockholders in such vote in
nowise intended to ratify the past violations of the antitrust laws or to author-
ize such a violation in the future, but only expressed the judgment of the
stockholders that it would not be the exercise of good business judgment to
sue for the past damages, now that they were assured that no future violations
would occur, under such circumstances the vote would not constitute a ratifi-
cation of such antitrust violations." 8 Could then, a board of directors avoid
a derivative suit by merely insuring that the minutes of shareholders' meetings
and literature sent to shareholders include statements to the effect that "the
forthcoming vote not to sue is an exercise of business judgment and is in
nowise intended to ratify the illegal act"? If so, what criteria would
be employed to resolve the question presented when both motives are set
forth: one shareholder requesting a vote not to sue in order to "ratify the
illegal act," while another calls for the exercise of sound "business judgment"?
The opinion summarily concludes that the continuing nature of the act,
coupled with re-election of the directors charged with illegal conduct demon-
strates the shareholders' acquiescence in the carrying on of the allegedly un-
lawful conduct. This view omits from consideration a host of possible
motivating factors which could also logically result in a stockholders' vote
not to sue and the re-election of the directors. It has been suggested that
IL
. . . unlike ratification—a common act, likely to be done with uniform
inattention, often by a blanket vote or even by acquiescence—a decision not
to sue would generally be the result of directed attention to the specific
problem of the advisability of the suit." 9 The determination not to enforce
a corporate cause of action would undoubtedly involve other considerations. 1°
7 As a bar:
Solomont & Sons Trust v. New England Theatre Operators, 326 Mass. 99,
93 N.E.2d 241 (1950) ; United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., supra
note 4.
Not a bar:
Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959); Seigman v.
Electric Vehicle Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 403, 65 AtI. 910 (1907).
8 Supra note I, at 537.
9 Supra note 6, at 1374.
10 "On principal, we perceive no reason why the usual rule recognizing that
it is for the corporation to decide questions of business policy should be subject
to an exception limiting the corporate power where a charge is made against an
officer or director but where an independent, disinterested majority of the stock-
holders acting reasonably and in good faith have voted that in their judgment
it is not in the best interest of the corporation to sue. We do not believe that
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"A corporation may wish to avoid the unfavorable publicity engendered
by a trial involving the fraud of its officers. It may wish to retain the good
will and the benefits of a generally profitable administration of the accused
directors."11 It is not unlikely that the shareholders considered the possible
effects of such an action upon the supply of tin plate scrap received from
American Can Co. The profitable history of the corporation while American
Can was principal supplier of tin plate scrap must certainly have been a
significant consideration, as the entire operation of M. and T. revolves
around the processing of tin plate scrap. Can the concept of ratification or
implied authorization be equated with the business judgment confronting
a shareholder in the face of such facts?' 2
The absence of criteria to guide the application of the above test sets
one in search of justification for empowering a minority shareholder to take
unilateral action to bring suit contrary to the expressed wishes of a majority
of shareholders. Such a right must find its source either in law or in public
policy. Examination of the applicable statutes reveals the former not to be
the case." The opinion suggests that public policy is a consideration pre-
venting a negative, disinterested shareholders' vote from barring a derivative
suit when the action is based solely on federal antitrust law." This is
contrary to the United Copper case holding which states: "The fact that
the cause of action is based on the Sherman Act does not limit . . . the
power of the body of stockholders, nor does it give to the individual share-
holders the right to interfere with the internal management of the corpo-
ration." 0
 What is the end served by the "public policy" which denies
validity to a reasonable bona fide decision by a disinterested majority that
more is to be gained by acquiescence than by suit?
It has been suggested that the sole end served by such a policy is the
possible deterrent effect it would have on dishonest directors." This view,
which would create among shareholders little Attorneys General, overlooks
the fact that Congress has provided for inhibiting dishonest conduct by
impressing upon public officials the duty of enforcing the antitrust laws,"
in such a case the power of effective decision shifts from a majority to a
minority of the stockholders. We know of no principal requiring that a cor-
poration once wronged cannot exercise an honest judgment to refrain from doing
that which may wrong it again." (Emphasis supplied.) Solomont & Sons Trust,
supra note, 7, at 114, 93 N.E.2d at 249.
11 64 Marv. L. Rev. 334, 335 (1950).
12
 "The question whether it is good judgment to sue is quite apart from the ques-
tion of ratification. This is a distinction of substance and not of form." Solomont &
Sons, supra note 7, at 111, 93 N.E.2d at 247.
13
 Though 15 U.S.C. §§ 16 and 26 provide that a person injured by a violation of
the antitrust laws may sue and shall be entitled to maintain a suit for injunctive relief,
if the violation is continuing in nature, under 15 U.S.C. §§ 4 and 9, the U.S. District
Attorneys have a duty to institute actions for an injunction against antitrust violations.
14
 Supra note 1, at 537.
15
 United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., supra note 3, at 264.
10
 Supra note 8, at 335. Accord, Kessler v. Ensley Co., t23 Fed. 546 (ND. Ala.
1903).
17 Supra note 10.
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regardless of whether the shareholders vote to sue or not. It is beneficial
to distinguish between violations of statutes and violations of the funda-
mental "corporate compact" or in fraud of the rights of stockholders.
The need to grant minority stockholders the power unilaterally to in-
stitute suit contrary to a negative stockholders' vote would not be
so great when violation of a statute is the subject of the action, as it
would be when there is a breach or violation of the "corporate compact"
or a fraud on the rights of stockholders. Thus, a situation where a board
of directors surcharges the corporation would call for greater protection of
the minority stockholder than where the directors violate a federal statute,
if public policy is to be invoked in the interest of inhibiting dishonest conduct.
The court referred to Seigman v. Electrical Vehicle Co. as a leading
case representing the concept that a negative shareholders' vote will not
bar a derivative suit, adopting the view that a vote not to sue is in reality
an attempted ratification of an illegal act and is therefore unlawful. How-
ever, that case can be reconciled by application of the above distinction
between violations of statutes and violations of the "corporate compact"
or in fraud on the stockholders' rights. There the stockholders attempted to
"ratify the illegal act" by voting not to sue former directors who allegedly
declared dividends out of capital assets and not surplus assets. Such action
struck to the core of the corporate organization, denying the shareholders
their interest guaranteed by the corporate structure. Clearly, an illegal
alteration of the basic corporate structure calls for greater protection of
the minority shareholder than the decision not to exercise the corporation's
right to bring suit under a Federal statute. 18 A derivative suit based on
alleged violations of antitrust legislation need not be granted in the interest
of "public policy" to inhibit dishonest conduct by directors, as statutory
provisions for enforcement of those statutes serve that end.
KENNETH H. ZIMBLE
Fair Trade Laws—Requirement of Fair and Open Competition—Ad-
mission by Defendant in His Answer is Insufficient to Prove Fair and Open
Competition in the Gasoline Market.—Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mays.1—Gulf Oil
Corporation brought a bill in equity against a gasoline retailer seeking to
enjoin him from selling Gulf gasoline below the minimum price established
in contracts between Gulf and other retailers pursuant to the Pennsylvania
18 "The fact that the bill calls for an inquiry into the illegality of the transaction
does not overcome the obstacle that ordinarily stockholders have no standing to inter-
fere with the management. Mere belief that the corporate action, taken or contemplated,
is illegal gives the stockholder no great right to interfere than is possessed by any other
citizen. Stockholders are not guardians of the public. The function of guarding the
public from acts deemed illegal rests with public officials." Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley
Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 343 (1936) (Brandeis, J.).
1 164 A.2d 656 (Penn. 1960).
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